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Abstract: Both the distinction between the 'internal' and 'external' phases of science 
and the concept of 'inductive risk' are core constructs in the values in science literature. 
However, both constructs have shortcomings, which, we argue, have concealed the 
unique significance of values in scientific representation. We defend three closely-
related proposals to rectify the problem: i) to draw a conceptual distinction between 
endorsing a 'fact' and making a decision about representation; ii) to employ a 
conception of inductive risk that aligns with this distinction, not one between 
internal/external phases in science; iii) to conceptualize 'representational risk' as a 
unique epistemic risk, no less significant than inductive risk. We outline the implications 




1. Introduction  
 
It is widely agreed in the 'values in science' literature that not all ways in which values 
play a role in science are equally epistemologically significant. In particular, many 
contributors attach special significance to the role of values in 'internal' (not 'external') 
phases of science,1 such as in managing inductive risk (Douglas 2000; 2009; Elliott & 
Richards 2017). Both the distinction between the internal/external phases of science 
and the concept of inductive risk, then, are core constructs in the values in science 
literature: both help philosophers interpret the epistemological significance of values in 
science. At the same time, both constructs have shortcomings: several contributors 
have argued that the internal/external distinction is insignificant (Bueter 2015; Elliott & 
McKaughan 2009; Winsberg 2018, Ch.9) and the definition of inductive risk is debated 
(Biddle & Kukla 2017; Powers 2017; Elliott & Richards 2017b). In this paper, we 
consider these shortcomings, and argue that they have prevented philosophers from 
fully appreciating and understanding the unique significance of values in scientific 
representation. Moreover, we argue for three closely related proposals to help 
recognize this significance: i) to draw a conceptual distinction between endorsing a 
'fact'2 and making a decision about representation; ii) to employ a conception of 
inductive risk that aligns with this distinction, not one between internal/external phases 
in science; iii) to conceptualize 'representational risk' as a unique epistemic risk, no less 
significant than inductive risk. We show that these three proposals generate a variety of 
benefits. 
 
1 Following Longino (1990, 85-86), Douglas (2000, 2009, 2016) uses the term "external" 
to describe the phases (stages, parts) of science in which non-epistemic value 
judgments are well-recognized and non-controversial; Winsberg (2018, Ch.9) also uses 
the term "external", while Elliott and McKaughan (2009) refer to "discovery and pursuit" 
and Bueter (2015) refers to the "context of discovery". We take all of the above terms to 
include "the choice of areas or aspects of the world to be illuminated by application of 
the rules [of scientific inquiry]" (Longino 1990, 85) and refer to value judgments that 
philosophers of science generally regard as "epistemically uninteresting" (Elliott & 
McKaughan 2009, 600). For brevity, throughout this paper, we use the terms 'external' 
and 'internal' to the distinguish between phases of science widely taken to involve 
uncontroversial/uninteresting value judgments and controversial/interesting ones, 
respectively. 
2 Throughout this paper, we modify Hempel’s phrase ‘adopting’ (also ‘accepting’) a ‘fact’ 
to ‘endorsing a fact’, which we take to mean endorsing a truth-apt claim about mind 
independent objects. We use scare quotes around ‘fact’ to indicate that we mean a 
claim of facticity, not that the claim is necessarily true. We replace ‘adopt’ (and ‘accept’) 
with ‘endorse’ because we take inductive risk, linked as it is to decision theory, to be 
associated with a choice of action, rather than with a cognitive attitude (the latter of 
which might or might not be conceptualized as a free choice). This is also in line with 
our discussion of probabilities in Section 4, where we take the central issue to be one of 
‘reporting’ a probability, rather than having one. We do not take a view on whether 




We build our argument on the 'models in science' literature, in which it is firmly 
established that models are not true or false, but rather adequate or inadequate for 
purpose (Alexandrova 2010; Bokulich & Parker 2020; Frigg & Hartmann 2020; Parker 
2010; 2020; van Fraassen 1980; Winsberg 2018; 2010). The unique way that this 
invites values to enter into science has yet to be fully articulated.3 In what follows, we 
show that adequacy for purpose, and its attendant value-ladenness, applies broadly 
to representational decisions in science. In our terminology, representational decisions 
include decisions about ‘what to represent’ (i.e., decisions about what entities to include 
in and exclude from a representation) and ‘how to represent’ (i.e., decisions about 
entities already chosen for inclusion in the representation), whether in a model or 
another representational device. For example, we take the choice of comparator in a 
clinical trial to be a 'what to represent' decision. This is because choice of comparator is 
constitutive of the scientific representation that the agents conducting the clinical trial 
intend to produce. To be clear: if agents conducting a clinical trial decide to compare 
adalimumab to methotrexate, not to sulfasalazine, then that decision determines that 
the trial will represent the relative efficacy of adalimumab and methotrexate— it 
determines that the trial will not represent the efficacy of sulfasalazine. For this reason, 
we argue, choice of comparator is a representational decision. So, too, we argue, are all 
decisions that are constitutive of a scientific representation that agents intend to 
produce: decisions concerning which study designs, categories, data sets, probability 
distributions, and parameter values to use are all representational decisions. As we will 
show, representational decisions have two important things in common: 1) they 
determine what information a scientific representation will include and exclude; 2) 
scientists’ goal in making them is not to land on what is ‘true’, but rather on what is 
adequate for purpose.  
 
To be sure, ours is not the usual way of understanding these decisions. The literature 
has yet to define a ‘representational decision’, and readers might question whether the 
decisions we characterize here as representational are not better understood in more 
general terms related to the scientific process. Biddle and Kukla (2017), for example, in 
their foundational work on epistemic risk, use the term “phronetic risk” to describe 
“epistemic risks that arise during the course of activities that are preconditions for or 
parts of empirical (inductive or abductive) reasoning, insofar as these are risks that 
need to be managed and balanced in light of values and interests” (italics ours) (220). 
Readers may be inclined, thus far into our argument, to understand the decisions we 
highlight as ‘phronetic’ decisions. However, our aim is to encourage readers to 
recognize specific phronetic decisions more precisely as representational decisions, 
and thus to link the models in science and values in science literatures. With this link, it 
 
3 An important exception is Peschard and van Fraassen (2014), who directly discuss the 
normativity of ‘relevance judgments’ in experimental modelling, noting “How we view 
modeling today gives reason to expect some novel insight in the role of values in 
science there” (4). In our interpretation, Alexandrova (2010) and Parker (2010, 2020) 
make it clear modelling is a value-laden process but do not draw explicit connections to 
the values in science literature. 
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is clear that representational decisions are, in every important respect, central to 
science- yet impossible to make without values.  
 
By now, philosophers widely agree that a type of scientific decision that is impossible to 
make without values is the type involving 'inductive risk' (Douglas 2000; 2009; Elliott & 
Richards 2017). Here, we argue that the most fruitful definition of inductive risk is the 
risk of endorsing a 'fact' whose objective truth value is false. As we will show, this is 
Hempel's original conception, evident on a close reading of his (1935a; 1935b; 1954; 
1965; 1981; 2000). We argue in favour of using Hempel's conception, as it helps us 
acknowledge the clear difference between endorsing a 'fact' and making a decision 
about representation. We then distinguish between 'hazards', 'hazardous events', and 
'harms' within 'risk'4 (Rausand 2011) and characterize representational decisions as a 
distinct hazard in science, which links to distinct hazardous events. We argue that this 
constitutes a unique and significant epistemic risk, which we call 'representational'.   
 
In the models in science literature, a clear boundary already exists between a truth-apt 
claim and a representational tool. As we will show, drawing the same boundary in the 
values in science literature, and extending it to corresponding decisions, provides for an 
elegant integration of these literatures and their most deep-rooted insights. Perhaps 
most importantly, this integrated literature will establish that values cannot be limited to 
an 'indirect role' when informing representational decisions.5 Representational decisions 
are normative decisions, requiring the same non-epistemic values that determine the 
purpose of an inquiry (cf. Peschard & van Fraassen 2014). Furthermore, 
representational decisions are the building blocks of scientific representations. These 
value-laden blocks do not build a value-free bridge between 'external' stages in science. 
 
At the same time, models and other representational devices, at least in an ideal world, 
are only tools: whether to accept a claim that ostensibly follows from them should 
always be a further decision, one at a certain 'end' of the epistemic line. These 'end-line' 
decisions were a point of focus in early debates about values in science, as in, we 
show, Jeffrey’s (1956) response to Rudner (1953). By distinguishing between inductive 
risk and representational risk, we can better appreciate the special character of these 
end-line decisions- and locate the precise (and unlikely) circumstances under which 
 
4 Following Rausand (2011), risk involves a hazard (e.g., riding a motorcycle), a 
hazardous event (e.g., crashing), and that event's undesired consequences or harm 
(e.g., getting injured or killed). 
5 Douglas (2009, especially Ch. 5) argues that non-epistemic values can legitimately 
play an 'indirect' role throughout scientific inquiry (i.e., in assessing the consequences of 
error and determining evidential standards) but should play a 'direct' role only in the 
early stages of scientific inquiry. Elliott (2013) argues that Douglas' (2009) proposal is 
both ambiguous and complicated by the multiple goals of science; we build here on his 
latter point. A related debate (in our interpretation) concerns whether it is possible for 
epistemic values to take 'priority' in scientific inquiry (e.g., Brown 2017; Steel 2017). As 
we will make clear, our position is that 'epistemic priority' is not possible throughout the 
process of representation. 
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reporting probabilities, rather than accepting or rejecting hypotheses, can preserve the 
value-free ideal (VFI). In short, availing ourselves of the concept of representational risk 
will help us adjudicate central, historic debates in the values in science literature. Yet 
the concept of representational risk is not important only from an historical perspective, 
or to debates now (mostly) in the rear-view mirror. On the contrary, the concept of 
representational risk informs current problems at the crossing of values in science and 
social epistemology, including epistemic injustice in science and value entrenchment in 
complex, multi-authored models. 
 
2. Adequacy for Purpose or Inductive Risk? 
 
We start with two home truths: models are not truth-apt but are evaluated for their 
adequacy for purpose- and purposes reflect values. What, then, is the epistemological 
significance of modelling decisions- or, more generally, decisions about scientific 
representation? These decisions have been sometimes framed as value judgments 
about the aims of research (Intemann 2015; Parker & Winsberg 2018), other times as 
having a subtle influence and significance distinct from inductive risk (Biddle & 
Winsberg 2009; Parker & Winsberg 2018; Winsberg 2010, 2012), other times as subject 
to inductive risk (Elliott & Richards 2017; Parker & Lusk 2019; Steel 2015). Consider, 
first, different discussions of values in climate modelling, starting with threads where the 
term 'inductive risk' is avoided (Intemann 2015; Parker & Winsberg 2018; Winsberg 
2010, 2012). In her (2015), Intemann submits that the goal of climate modelling is to 
generate "useful" predictions and, thus, value judgments must be made about the aims 
of research and "the extent to which particular practices, methodologies, or models are 
likely to promote those aims" (219). In their own discussion of climate modelling, Parker 
and Winsberg (2018) acknowledge that modelling goals often stem from "non-epistemic 
interests and values" and that purposes and priorities determine what things are 
represented in a model and how they are represented (128). Parker and Winsberg 
(2018) even establish that parameter values themselves may vary as a function of the 
priorities guiding calibration efforts, e.g., ensuring model output aligns with observations 
of particular variables (128). In this respect, they remark, modelling results are 
dependent on the non-epistemic values that determine purposes and priorities, as 
different values around these would produce different results (Parker & Winsberg 2018, 
129). However, they concede that this point "is a variation on the familiar point that our 
current knowledge at any given time depends on (among other things) what we 
considered important enough to investigate, and thus on our interests and values" 
(Parker & Winsberg 2018, 130).  
 
In our interpretation, the above remarks suggest that certain modelling decisions are 
viewed as value judgments associated with the 'external' phase of science (Bueter 
2015; Douglas 2016; Elliott & McKaughan 2009). Parker and Winsberg (2018), at least, 
directly suggest that some modelling decisions equate to 'choice of question', an 
external value judgment of the important-yet-not-controversial variety (Longino 1990, 
83-85; Elliott & McKaughan 2009). At the same time, both Intemann (2015) and Parker 
and Winsberg (2018) acknowledge that these decisions will influence model results. 
This reinforces the conclusion that 'external' value judgments have a more significant 
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influence on theory appraisal than is generally appreciated (Bueter 2015; Elliott and 
McKaughan 2009; Winsberg 2018, Ch.9)- although neither Intemann (2015) nor Parker 
and Winsberg (2018) mounts a direct challenge to the internal/external distinction. 
Indeed, Parker and Winsberg (2018) seem to accept the premise that the value-
dependency they initially identify is epistemologically insignificant. At least, they 
concede it exists, then go on to emphasize the (lesser-known) fact that estimates from a 
given model routinely become entrenched and incorporated into other models. Parker 
and Winsberg's (2018) argument echoes points made by Winsberg (2010, 2012), who 
stresses that model performance depends on the context in which it was developed, 
including decisions to prioritize certain predictive tasks over others. For Winsberg, 
"predictive preferences" (2012,131) are distinct from inductive risk, yet epistemologically 
significant because they influence the estimation of uncertainties in a subtle way, 
beyond what can be tracked in practice or adjusted for in assigning probabilities to 
hypotheses (see Winsberg 2010, especially 110-111; 2012). Thus, for Parker and 
Winsberg (2018) and Winsberg (2010, 2012), value judgments about the aims of 
research are epistemologically insignificant until they exert an influence beyond what is 
well-recognized- until they become embedded in the "nooks and crannies" of models 
(Winsberg 2012, 132). 
 
Consider, now, a discussion of values in climate modelling centered around inductive 
risk (Parker & Lusk 2019). Parker and Lusk (2019) indicate that inductive risk is relevant 
to modelling decisions, particularly when "uncertain methodological choices are 
unavoidable" (1645) and there is a "risk of error" (1644). Following Douglas (2000, 
2009), they explain that, on the inductive risk view, if it is ever unclear which 
methodological option "will give the most accurate results, scientists should consider 
how each option would affect the risk of different types of error and how bad the 
consequences of those errors would be" (1644). They write: "if choices [in climate 
modelling] must be made, they could be made in light of the inductive risk preferences 
of the user or client: if it would be particularly bad for the user’s purposes for uncertainty 
to be underestimated, then the provider might select those methodological options that 
will deliver a broader uncertainty estimate" (Parker and Lusk 2019, 1647, italics ours). 
This raises an important question: if purposes and priorities determine what things are 
represented in a model and how they are represented, including parameter values 
themselves and model results (Parker & Winsberg 2018, 128), do purposes and 
priorities not present a risk of error? Parker and Lusk (2019) acknowledge that 
modelling decisions are made with the model user's purposes in mind. What is the 
difference between 'error' and inadequacy for purpose?  
 
One ought to be able to turn to the definition of inductive risk to know how to distinguish 
it from decisions around adequacy for purpose. Although there are a few definitions of 
inductive risk (Elliott & Richards 2017b), by far the most influential is due to Douglas 
(2000, 2009). Douglas (2000) interprets Hempel's inductive risk as "the risk of error in 
accepting or rejecting hypotheses" (561), but she marks inductive risk as present in 
choosing a research methodology and gathering, characterizing, and interpreting data 
(565), which makes it clear that her own definition does not refer to hypothesis 
acceptance/rejection alone. Rather, Douglas' (2000) definition of inductive risk refers 
7 
more broadly to the risk of error generally (559, 572). Critically, error is an ambiguous 
term, which can refer to any sort of mistake in judgment. Thus, it is necessary to read 
Douglas (2000) in detail for a full understanding of her definition. Most specifically, 
Douglas (2000) remarks: 
 
 "...significant inductive risk is present at each of the three "internal" stages of 
 science: choice of methodology, gathering and characterization of the data, and 
 interpretation of the data. At each point, one can make a wrong (i.e., 
 epistemically incorrect) choice, with consequences following from that choice. A 
 chosen methodology assumed to be reliable may not be. A piece of data 
 accepted as sound may be the product of error. An interpretation may rely on a 
 selected background assumption that is erroneous. Thus, just as there is 
 inductive risk for accepting theories, there is inductive risk for accepting 
 methodologies, data, and interpretations." (565) 
 
In our interpretation, Douglas's definition of 'error' is "a wrong (i.e., epistemically 
incorrect) choice" and her definition of inductive risk is the possibility of this type of error 
in the internal stages of science. Still, this definition requires some further analysis due 
to the use of the term “incorrect", which can mean not correct as to fact or, more 
generally, inappropriate.  Arguably, Douglas (2000) does not mean 'not correct as to 
fact', since her definition locates inductive risk in choice of methodology, gathering and 
characterization of data, which include choices that, by broad consensus, cannot be 
'factually' right or wrong. To avoid making a category mistake, Douglas (2000) must 
mean 'incorrect' in the sense of 'inappropriate'. However, this leaves us with the same 
confusion, since it is not clear what the difference is between inappropriate and 
inadequate for purpose.  
 
Ultimately, Douglas (2000) does not give us the resources to distinguish 'error' from 
inadequacy for purpose. In practice, Douglas’ (2000) definition of inductive risk is no 
more specific than ‘the risk of making any choice that is inadequate for purpose in the 
internal stages of science’; the definition simply invites philosophers to defend (or not) 
their own interpretation of ‘internal stages of science’ and why the choice in focus 
occurs within that stage. We argue that this definition is not as useful as it could be for 
understanding the role of values in science. For one, there is no ‘factual’ or ‘essential’ 
line between external and internal stages in science: it is up to philosophers to draw the 
line in whatever way serves their purpose. Already, philosophers have begun to analyze 
the ‘inductive risk’ in choosing to use composite outcome scores and specific clinical 
trial designs (Bluhm 2017; Stanev 2017). In our view, either the next step is for 
philosophers to debate whether such choices ‘really occur’ in the ‘internal’ stages of 
science, or to decide whether they really have a special interest in those stages as far 
they understand them now. Elliott and McKaughan (2009), Bueter (2015) and Winsberg 
(2018, Ch. 9) have already given us good reasons to have an equal interest in the 
external stages of science, including the fact that decisions made in these stages 
influence which hypotheses are accepted and rejected. As Winsberg (2018) puts it, 
"deciding what data to collect, and when to stop collecting more, can have a strong 
influence on what probabilities we will assign to hypotheses" (137). To illustrate his 
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point, Winsberg asks us to imagine that it is 1925 and the hypothesis that smoking 
causes cancer is generally being assigned a low probability- should society spend 
money to study whether the hypothesis is true? Winsberg remarks: 
 
 "The answer to the question of whether we should spend the money will have an 
 obvious impact on the degree of belief we assign to the hypothesis. Of course 
 the 1925 scientists cannot predict whether the research will raise or lower the 
 probability of the hypothesis, but they can predict that it will very likely push that 
 probability in one direction or another. This blurs the line between the epistemic 
 and the normative in a way that most commenters seem to believe won't happen 
 if the values only play a role that is "external" to science." (Winsberg 2018, 137) 
 
 
This conclusion, we think, is a sufficient reason to set aside the vague external/internal 
distinction and make more specific distinctions between activities in science that are 
importantly different. In the remainder of this paper, we will argue that a useful 
distinction to draw is between building scientific representations and interpreting them: 
between making a representational decision and endorsing a 'fact'. In turn, we will argue 
in favour of defining inductive risk as the risk that plagues the latter activity: as the risk 
of endorsing a 'fact' whose objective truth value is false. This, as we will show, is how 
Hempel defined it, and putting this historical definition to use has numerous advantages. 
Among them is distinguishing inductive risk from 'representational risk', the risk of 
making a representational decision that is inadequate for purpose. As we will show, this 
risk is not only epistemically interesting, but philosophically fruitful in a number of ways. 
 
3. Hempel's Inductive Risk 
 
To interpret Hempel’s account of inductive risk, it is useful to trace its roots in debates in 
early 20th Century, logical positivist discussions of confirmation and empirical 
significance.  Readers will recall that many logical positivists believed, at least early on, 
that in order to be meaningful, a synthetic claim must be implied by a finite number of 
observation sentences.  Many different versions of this claim, including many 
weakenings of it, were defended, but always central was the idea that meaningful 
discourse was tightly connected to confirmation, where confirmation was a relation that 
obtained between various kinds of claims and a special kind of claim: observation 
statements, or what members of the Vienna Circle often called ‘protocol statements’. 
 
In Hempel's (1935a), he reviews Carnap's early conception of protocol statements ("the 
result of pure immediate experience without any theoretical addition") and distinction 
between empirical laws ("general implicative statements") and singular statements (e.g., 
"Here is now a temperature of 20 degrees centigrade") (51-52). On this view, general 
statements are tested by their singular consequences, i.e., by unique experimental or 
experiential results. However, because singular consequences are infinite, general 
statements can never be fully verified, only more or less supported. This prompts 
Hempel to conclude that all general statements have the character of a hypothesis 
(1935a, 52). He then recalls Carnap's own conclusion that singular statements have the 
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same character: singular statements (like “here is now a black raven”) can only be more 
or less confirmed, and there is no clear minimum degree of confirmation for a singular 
statement to be adopted; thus, the adoption or rejection of a singular statement 
depends upon a decision (1935a, 58). These decisions are at the heart of Hempel’s 
inductive risk. 
 
Turning to interpret Carnap's and Neurath's more recent ideas, Hempel (1935a) 
comments: "Even the protocol statements are revealed to be hypotheses in relation to 
other statements of the whole system; and so a protocol statement, like every other 
statement, is at the end adopted or rejected by a decision" (58, italics ours). This implies 
that all empirical statements have the character of a hypothesis. The same view is 
evident in Hempel's (1935b, 96) and 1937 essay "The Problem of Truth" (Hempel 2000 
[1937], 52).6 Thus, for Hempel, deciding to adopt any empirical statement counts as 
accepting or rejecting a hypothesis.  Adopting “all ravens are black” and “this is a black 
raven” or even, “this thing in front of me is black” are all cases of adopting a hypothesis 
and all involve a decision. 
 
In introducing the term 'inductive risk' in his (1954), Hempel uses the example of 
attributing the disposition 'solubility-in-water' to a lump of sugar that is not actually put in 
water. He remarks that to do so "is to make a generalization, and this involves an 
inductive risk" (14), further noting that if we were to reject any procedure that involves IR 
we would be prohibited from using dispositional concepts (14-15). In revisiting the 
concept of inductive risk in his (1965), Hempel notes that any empirical law is accepted 
on the basis of incomplete evidence, though "[such] an acceptance carries with it the 
'inductive risk' that the presumptive law does not hold in full generality" (92). While his 
ensuing discussion of statistical testing might suggest that his remarks on values apply 
only to hypothesis acceptance or rejection in that context, we do not interpret them so 
narrowly. Rather, we take it that Hempel uses examples from statistical testing because 
they are salient and rhetorically effective, though he is aware his comments are more 
far-reaching. Hempel confirms this in his (1981), in which he discusses the debate 
between Rudner (1953) and Jeffrey (1956). To a list of difficulties facing Jeffrey's 
argument Hempel adds:  
 
 "Even if the scientist limits himself to determining probabilities for hypotheses, he 
 must perform tests to obtain the evidence on the basis of which to calculate 
 those probabilities. He must, therefore, it seems, accept certain empirical 
 statements after all, namely the evidence sentences by which he judges the 
 probability of contemplated hypotheses."7 (Hempel 1981, 395, italics ours) 
 
6 e.g., "...any of the ordinary physical statements, even such as 'This is a piece of iron,' 
is a hypothesis the adoption of which depends in the end upon a convention." (Hempel 
1935b, 96); "...this system of observation sentences does not form an absolutely fixed 
and unshakeable basis, for each directly verifiable sentence is itself only a hypothesis." 
(Hempel 2000, 52). 
	
7 Of course, Jeffrey might reply that even the evidence sentences can be assigned 
probabilities, rather than accepted or rejected. For now, it suffices to take this passage 
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Thus, though Hempel in the above uses 'hypotheses' in the limited sense in which 
frequentists nowadays use the term, he confirms that his inductive risk extends to the 
acceptance of empirical statements generally. This is consistent, we note, with Rudner's 
(1953) conclusion. Although Rudner is sometimes read as suggesting that scientists 
make value judgments only at the end of a formal hypothesis test or empirical study, at 
the end of his essay he explicitly extends his conclusions to all scientific hypotheses, in 
the same sense as Hempel. Rudner (1953, 5) quotes Quine (1951): 
 
 "Science is a unified structure, and in principle it is the structure as a whole, and 
 not its component statements one by one, that experience confirms or shows to 
 be imperfect. Carnap maintains that ontological questions, and likewise 
 questions of logical or mathematical principle, are questions not of fact but of 
 choosing a convenient conceptual scheme or framework for science; and with 
 this I agree only if the same be conceded for every scientific hypothesis." (Quine 
 1951, 72) 
 
Readers will recall that Quine, pace Carnap, argued that there was no clear line 
between internal and external questions, and hence that if Carnap was right that a 
choice of logic, for example, involved a value judgment, then so did the choice to say 
that 'there is a black swan here' (Leitgeb & Carus 2020). Thus, while we think the 
Quinean Rudner would disagree with Hempel on the reasons why it is so, he would 
agree that all statements of matters of fact, whether statistical or not, involve a value 
judgment. 
 
This brings us to consider how best to define Hempel’s inductive risk. For clarity, we 
conform our definition to the bow-tie model of risk, i.e., risk as hazard, hazardous event, 
and harm (Rausand 2011):  
 
Hempel's Inductive Risk (IR) 
 
Hazard: endorsing a 'fact', a truth-apt claim about the world with an objective truth 
value8  
 
to be textual evidence that Hempel included all empirical statements, even basic ones, 
under the umbrella of hypotheses about which there is inductive risk. 
8 An anonymous referee reminds us that much of the literature defines inductive risk so 
that it is associated not only with endorsing a fact that is false, but failing to endorse a 
fact that is true. Here, we should note that failing to endorse a fact comprises two 
alternatives: endorsing its negation and remaining silent. It is clear that the risk involved 
in endorsing its negation is Hempel’s IR: the hazard is exactly as specified here (i.e., 
endorsing a 'fact', albeit a different one) and thus links to the same type of hazardous 
event and the same type of harm. It is not clear that the risk involved in remaining silent 
is Hempel’s IR, since the hazard ‘remaining silent’ is different and cannot link to the 
same hazardous event (i.e., ‘remaining silent’ cannot link to ‘endorsing a 'fact' whose 
objective truth value is false). Regardless, what is clear is that when deciding whether or 
not to endorse a fact, one must weigh the relative harms and benefits of endorsing it, 
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Hazardous event: endorsing a 'fact' whose objective truth value is false 
Harm: whatever undesired consequences, specified or unspecified, may follow from 
endorsing the 'false fact'  
 
In what follows, we will contrast Hempel's inductive risk with 'representational risk', 
which we will define as follows: 
 
Representational Risk (RR) 
 
Hazard: making a representational decision in science 
Hazardous event: making a representational decision that is inadequate for purpose, 
either for our own purpose or for the purpose of other epistemic agents 
Harm: whatever undesired consequences, specified or unspecified, may follow from 
making an inadequate representational decision 
 
As we will show in the next section, distinguishing between IR and RR helps clarify the 
significance of Jeffrey's (1956) response to Rudner, and allows us to acknowledge 
certain differences between rationalist and personalist probabilists. After establishing 
this, we go on to show just how epistemically interesting it is to compare IR and RR in 
terms of the hazardous events and harms that may result from each, and to consider 
the background conditions that are relevant to RR. 
 
4. What's the Risk in Reporting Probabilities? 
 
Readers will recall that Jeffrey (1956) replies to Rudner (1953) that it is not the job of 
the scientist qua scientist to accept or reject hypotheses; rather, she must only assign 
probabilities to hypotheses. Here, we apply the distinct concepts of IR and RR in order 
to establish what risk the scientist qua scientist faces in assigning probabilities to 
hypotheses and what implications this has for the VFI. In doing so, we defend our 
interpretation of Jeffrey's (1956) response to Rudner (1953).  
 
Philosophers sometimes take Jeffrey to be claiming that he has rebutted Rudner 
regarding the untenability of the VFI- more specifically, to be claiming that the VFI is 
tenable because scientists need not accept or reject hypotheses.9 However, a close 
 
endorsing its negation, or remaining silent. We think the significance of this is built into 
the fact that assessing a risk, as we define it, always involves comparing the possible 
consequences of taking an action with those of not taking an action, so the risk of 
accepting a fact automatically involves comparing the possible consequences of 





9 Just for example: “Jeffrey proposed that scientists should assign probabilities to 
hypotheses in light of the available evidence and pass these probabilities along to policy 
makers.” (Steel 2015, 81)”; “Jeffrey asserted that probabilities in a Bayesian approach 
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reading of Jeffrey's two-paragraph conclusion shows that he is rebutting in Rudner just 
the claim about scientists' being obliged to accept or reject hypotheses- and that, in fact, 
he marks the VFI's tenability as an open question that depends on the result of debates 
in the foundations of probability (Jeffrey 1956, 245-246). Ending the first paragraph of 
his conclusion, Jeffrey writes, “In any event, we conclude that it is not the business of 
the scientist as such, least of all of the scientist who works with lawlike hypotheses10, to 
accept or reject hypotheses” (245). Opening the second he writes, "We seem to have 
been driven to the conclusion that the scientist's proper role is to provide the rational 
agents in the society which he represents with probabilities for the hypotheses which on 
the other account he simply accepts or rejects" (245, italics ours). Here, we might take 
Jeffrey as thinking he has saved the VFI, if we were to ignore that he goes on to list 
"great difficulties with this view", including that it “presupposes a satisfactory theory of 
probability in the sense of degree of confirmation for hypotheses on given evidence” 
(245, italics ours). 
 
What Jeffrey refers to here is a logic of confirmation, something to make it a matter of 
logic what the probability of a hypothesis is conditional on the evidence, as was sought 
by the Carnapian rationalist probabilists. Readers will recall that there are two 
competing schools of thought among ‘probabilists’ about the nature of 'original' prior 
probabilities (Galavotti 1991). According to the first, 'rationalist' school (represented by 
Carnap), there is an objectively correct probability that a scientist should attach to each 
hypothesis in light of the evidence she has. According to the second, 'personalist' 
school (represented by Ramsey and de Finetti), any set of priors whatsoever is 
allowable, as long as it obeys the axioms of probability. On the personalist view, 
probabilities are simply things that we have; they are neither things we decide on, nor 
things that are objectively true or false. Having defined the Hempel's IR above, we can 
say that, for the rationalist probabilist, there is IR11 in attaching probabilities to 
hypotheses, but for the personalist, there is not. This is because the rationalist and the 
personalist construe probabilities in fundamentally different ways, and only on the 
rationalist view does reporting a probability amount to endorsing an objectively true or 
false 'fact'. 
 
In referring to the search for a logic of confirmation, Jeffrey (himself a thinker more often 
associated with personalist probabilism) makes an important point. That is: to save the 
VFI, not only must the job of scientists be limited to providing probabilities, but the 
rationalists must be fully successful in their project. That is, for scientists to provide 
probabilities in a value free manner a) the rationalists must be right that there is a 
 
are not the sort of thing one chooses to accept or reject; they are degrees of belief 
scientists have and which they should report to policy makers.” (Steel 2015, 81, italics in 
the original) 
10 Note, inter alia, that here Jeffrey is tipping his hand that, according to him, like 
Hempel, even singular statements like “it is raining outside” are subject to IR if accepted 
or rejected. It is just lawlike hypotheses, that are “least of all” immune to it. 
11 Although on some rationalist accounts, there will be no risk at all, because 
determining the probability will be a matter of a uniquely correct logic, as we 
acknowledge below. 
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unique correct logic of probability and b) scientists must have it in hand and be 
omniscient with respect to it.   
 
Let us now compare the consequences of the (various) rationalist and personalist 
probabilist positions for what hazards scientists engage in, what hazardous events 
scientists risk, and what harms scientists can bring about. Again, for the rationalist, 
there is an objectively correct probability the scientist should attach to each hypothesis 
in light of the evidence she has. This can free her from engaging in any hazard iff there 
is a uniquely correct logic of probabilities, and she is a perfect reasoner with it. 
Reporting the probability she calculates, then, will present no hazard since there will be 
no possibility of being wrong.  However, a hazard will present itself if:  
 
1. There is a uniquely correct logic but the scientist is not a perfect reasoner with it 
2. There is more than one allowable logic (as Carnap maintained) 
 
In the first case, the scientist will be making a decision that can be objectively wrong, 
and so a possible hazardous event is making an objectively wrong claim. The 
corresponding risk is Hempel's IR. In the second case, the hazard is the choice of which 
allowable logic to use. Here, there is (by stipulation) no objectively correct logic, so the 
possible hazardous event is not choosing an objectively wrong one. It follows that there 
is no IR.  However, a possible hazardous event is choosing a suboptimal logic. 
Choosing a logic is a representational decision, and, at least according to Carnap, a 
logic can only be suboptimal with respect to some pragmatic framework. Given the 
possibility that the scientist will choose a logic that is suboptimal with respect to her 
own, or her stakeholders', pragmatic goals, she faces RR.  
 
Turning now to the personalists, readers will recall three key features of their position. 
First, any set of priors is allowed, as long as it obeys the axioms of probability. Second, 
probabilities are not things we decide on, nor things that are objectively true or false, but 
simply degrees of belief. Third, degrees of belief are cognitive states that, in concert 
with non-cognitive states like utilities, guide all behavior. While 'having' probabilities is 
not a behavior, providing probabilities is one indeed, and the scientist will provide to her 
'consumer' whatever probability the providing of which she thinks will maximize her own 
expected utility.12  
 
It follows from the above that, for the personalist, there is no IR in reporting probabilities, 
not in 'having' them, nor in 'providing' them. However, providing probabilities involves 
representation, and there is a possible hazardous event in this process: possibly, the 
scientist will provide probabilities that are based on the wrong utilities—either utilities 
the scientist later comes to regret, or utilities that do not represent those of her 
 
12 Ramsey and de Finetti are both clear in various places that this follows from their 
view. See Shafer (1981) and Gibbard (2007), especially section 3, for more recent 
discussions. Decision theory on the part of the expert will quickly become a matter of 
game theory between expert and customer, because the customer will soon realize that 
probabilities are being given strategically, and hijinx will ensue. How to deal with this 
when eliciting credences from experts was first discussed by Brier (1950). 
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stakeholders. So while personalism about probability frees scientists from IR, it does not 




5. Representational Risk 
 
Within the risk concept, hazards, hazardous events, and harms may be distinguished 
(Rausand 2011).13 A banana peel in one's book bag does not lead to slipping; a banana 
peel on the floor does not lead to a smelly book bag. A slipper may dust himself off or 
head to the hospital; a book bag may or may not need to be replaced altogether- a 
number of background conditions may determine the ultimate outcome.14 In the 
previous section, we contrasted two hazards-- accepting/rejecting a hypothesis and 
providing probabilities--and showed that personalists will regard these as distinct and 
appreciate that each leads to a unique hazardous event (even if downstream harms are 
left unspecified). In this section, we review representational decisions other than 
providing probabilities, and further illustrate how they differ from endorsing a 'fact'. Once 
there can be no doubt that representational decisions are a distinct hazard, risking a 
distinct hazardous event, we turn to specifying some of their potential harms under 
different background conditions relevant to RR. 
 
5.1 Distinct Hazards, Distinct Hazardous Events 
 
In Hempel's IR, the hazard is endorsing a 'fact', a truth-apt claim about the world with an 
objective truth value. With respect to some representational decisions, it is easy to see 
that Hempel's hazard is not at issue, as nothing resembling an objective truth value is 
anywhere to be found. For example, scientists do not speak of a 'false' study design; 
none argues that composite outcome measures are 'true'. Diagnostic criteria for disease 
may shift with a growing understanding of facts, but those facts do not determine what 
the disease is truly. It is not in these cases that there may still be some doubt that 
making representational decisions differs from endorsing facts. Rather, we think, this 
doubt might linger when it comes to representational decisions that concern a 
quantitative value, such as parameters in simulation models. For example, it might 
seem that if a climate model inputs the acceleration of gravity as 9.8 m/s2 it is because 
that is the true value. Indeed, in this context, modellers may seek- and find- something 
that resembles an objective truth value. However, this is a red herring: where model 
parameters are populated with 'true' values, those values are not chosen because they 
are true, but because they are adequate for purpose. This is made clear by the fact that, 
in many cases, only a false parameter value may be adequate (Parker 2010, 990). For 
example, a climate model might make the acceleration of gravity vary from the equator 
 
13 Following Rausand (2011), a hazard is "a source of danger that may cause harm to 
an asset", a hazardous event "the first event in a sequence of events that, if not 
controlled, will lead to undesired consequences (harm)" (598-99). As noted, harm can 
be understood broadly as undesired consequences. 
14 See e.g., Rausand (2011): "external events and conditions may influence the event 
sequences" (129). 
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to the poles to adjust for its exclusion of the centrifugal ‘force’ associated with the 
Earth’s rotation. Or consider parameter values for cloud formation in climate models.  
Here, modellers do not choose the value that best represents cloud formation, but the 
one that best balances out the fact that all climate models leak energy at the top of the 
atmosphere (Winsberg 2018, Ch.10). Furthermore, a great many quantitative values 
input to representational tools do not have a corresponding truth value. To use Parker's 
(2010, 990) example, there is no single speed at which all ice crystals fall in clouds. To 
use Winsberg's (2010, 82) example, there is no true value for the bonding energy of a 
"silogen atom", since there is no such thing (despite the fact that they are modelled in 
crack propagation). 
 
From the above examples, we should draw a broad lesson: making a representational 
decision differs from endorsing a fact. They are distinct hazards: the latter leads to a 
very specific hazardous event (endorsing a 'fact' whose objective truth value is false), 
the former a more variegated inadequacy. Still, a sticking point remains: in some 
models, the 'true' value for a parameter will be the only one considered adequate for 
purpose. In this case, it seems, inadequacy would constitute falseness. This may invite 
the objection that populating these values involves inductive risk, blurring the purported 
distinction between it and RR. However, readers familiar with sensitivity analyses will 
continue to appreciate the distinction between these two risks. In models where having 
the 'true' value for a parameter is of great importance, it is common to input a range of 
values for that parameter to see the effects of getting it wrong. Sometimes, modellers 
will find that the 'true' value can be varied to some, even great, extent without affecting 
model results. In other words, there will be no downstream harm that results from 
incorporating a 'false fact' into the representation. In this case, IR is not an apt 
descriptor. Other times, results are found to be sensitive to that value, and modellers 
face a subsequent decision regarding how to represent their findings, including justifying 
the range of values used in sensitivity analyses (after all, this range typically has no 
corresponding truth value). In this case, IR is not an apt descriptor either. The value of 
distinguishing between IR and RR will become even clearer when we consider the 
unique harms that can result from representational decisions, which extend beyond 
those that stem from endorsing a 'false fact'. 
 
One last sticking point: a representational decision that is inadequate for purpose can 
most certainly lead to an inference to a 'false fact'. For example, Stanev (2017) 
describes how the use of a composite outcome measure in a clinical trial resulted in an 
inference to a 'false fact' about a drug's effects. In this context, readers might object, the 
'hazardous event' in our so-called RR is identical to that in Hempel's IR. Our reply is that 
this is not quite right: rather, through the IR lens, the hazardous event is an inference to 
a 'false fact', and through the RR lens, the hazardous event is inadequacy for purpose.  
This matters, we argue, because the RR lens invites us to view an inference to a false 
fact as a downstream harm, which emphasizes that it can be prevented upstream. For 
example, in analyzing Stanev's (2017) case study through the RR lens, we are 
encouraged to ask under what circumstances a composite outcome score is adequate 
for purpose, and what is necessary to ensure one does not persuade us to endorse a 
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'false fact'. With this, we turn to how representational decisions can result in harms 
unrelated to endorsing a 'false fact', under a variety of background conditions. 
 
5.2 Distinct Harms Under Distinct Conditions 
 
In general, representational decisions determine what information will be highlighted 
and what information will be obscured by a scientific representation (van Fraassen 
2008). For a representational decision to be adequate for purpose, it must highlight the 
information that the (relevant) epistemic agents desire, and obscure only the information 
that they do not. When representational decisions are inadequate for purpose, one 
possible downstream event is that epistemic agents will endorse a 'false fact' and harm 
will result from this. However, representational decisions can result in harms that are 
unrelated to ‘false facts’: in lamentably incomplete scientific results, irrelevant or 
distracting results, even pernicious and unjust gaps in scientific knowledge. The concept 
of RR, we argue, invites us to consider these distinct harms, and the role of background 
conditions in determining whether or not they will result from representational decisions. 
We show this by considering well-known issues in the design of clinical trials, and their 
influence on trial results and (later on) simulation models in health economics. 
 
Consider, first, the choice of comparators (i.e., experimental and control interventions) 
in a clinical trial. This representational decision is a straightforward extension of the 
research question: for example, a clinical trial may aim to answer whether an 
experimental treatment is more efficacious than placebo, or more efficacious than an 
active treatment, such as the one typically used in clinical practice (the 'standard of 
care')(Anderson 2006). At the same time, choice of comparators has an obvious, 
significant influence on the content and impact of trial results (Bluhm 2017; Glasser and 
Howard 2006; Mann and Djulbegovic 2013; Wilholt 2009). One specific problem is the 
possibility of a "substandard comparison" (Wilholt 2009, 93) or "comparator bias" (Mann 
and Djulbegovic 2013, 30). These terms refer to the practice of comparing experimental 
treatments to control interventions that are less effective than the standard of care: 
either the "inappropriate" use of placebo or the use of an "inappropriate" active 
comparator (e.g., the standard of care in a suboptimal dose) (Mann and Djulbegovic 
(2013, 30-31). As Bluhm (2017) explains, many experts argue that using an appropriate 
comparator is an "epistemological requirement" (203): 
 
 "This is because a trial should provide knowledge that is useful to those clinicians 
 who would be using the results of a trial. What clinicians—and for that matter 
 patients —want to know about a promising new medication is not whether it is 
 better than a placebo, but whether it is a better therapy (or at least as good a 
 therapy) as the one(s) already available and used in clinical practice. The only 
 way to answer this question is to actually test the new drug against a current 
 therapy." (Bluhm 2017, 203, italics ours) 
 
The expectation that clinical trials should provide "knowledge that is useful" is an 
important condition: it indicates what is required for the choice of comparator to be 
adequate for purpose. Yet, obviously, different stakeholders have different views of 
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what knowledge is useful. As Mann and Djulbegovic (2013) remark "It is not surprising, 
therefore, that researchers, sponsors, patients and government regulators may have 
different views on the selection of comparators" (106). It follows that to be able to define 
'comparator bias'- to identify the use of an 'inappropriate' comparator- it is necessary to 
know whose purposes are meant to be fulfilled by a clinical trial. This points us to one 
important background condition relevant to RR: for whose purposes a representational 
decision is expected to be adequate. 
 
For the sake of argument, let us assume, as Bluhm suggests, that a clinical trial should 
provide knowledge that is useful to patients and clinicians- that is, that representational 
decisions, like choice of comparators, should be adequate for their purposes. If 
representational decisions in clinical trial design do not meet this expectation, what is 
the harm? (To be sure, it is not necessarily a 'false fact': clearly it is possible to provide  
information that it is 'true' but not the useful knowledge sought.) At a minimum, we think, 
the harm would be trial results that are lamentably incomplete from the perspective of 
patients and clinicians. At least, when a trial shows that a "promising new medication" is 
better than placebo- but not whether it is a better than a medication already used in 
clinical practice- we might call those results 'incomplete' and aim to further characterize 
the harm in that. At the same time, it seems that other, possibly more severe, harms 
might result from an inadequate choice of comparators under other conditions. For 
example, what if the experimental treatment under study is "promising" only from the 
perspective of the developer, and not promising from the perspective of patients and 
clinicians? What if, for example, the experimental treatment is a 'me-too' drug almost 
indistinguishable from an existing generic (Gastala et al. 2016), or a preventive 
medication for which there is little evidence of demand, even some evidence of disdain 
(Mosor et al. 2020)? In these cases, we argue, the representational decision has a built-
in inadequacy, but the harm is not 'incomplete' results; rather, the harm is, at least, 
'irrelevant' or 'distracting' results. Yet to distinguish between these subtly different harms 
requires additional knowledge of background conditions, of specific details about the 
context of purposes among clinicians and patients.  
 
As much as scientific results that are incomplete, irrelevant, or distracting are clearly 
distinct from 'false' ones, one possible objection is that these are not really serious 
harms. Although we think this objection might stand under some conditions, it is unlikely 
to stand under others. Consider the significance, now, of choice of comparators not in a 
single clinical trial, but in clinical trials generally, specifically in the context of their 
overwhelming sponsorship by pharmaceutical companies (Lundh et al. 2017). Light and 
Lexchin (2021), for example, argue that clinical trials sponsored by pharmaceutical 
companies employ a "strategic ignorance": not only strategic choices of comparators, 
but numerous other strategies designed to hide the risk of adverse effects associated 
with experimental treatments (4). These strategies include limiting the length of clinical 
trials, recording only certain adverse effects, and excluding participants with co-
morbidities (Light and Lexchin 2020, 4) all of which, we note, relate to representational 
decisions and their capacity to obscure information. In our interpretation, what Light and 
Lexchin (2021) describe is a systematic and persistent obscuring of information by an 
institution of social power, which suggests that the resulting gaps in knowledge could 
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potentially be viewed as an epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007; Kidd, Pohlhaus, & Medina 
2017). This invites us to consider the social power dynamics that determine whose 
purposes inform representational decisions in clinical trials. 
 
As Glasser and Howard (2006) emphasize, there are at least ten different issues in 
clinical trial design that can affect the outcome of a trial: choice of comparator, eligibility 
criteria, and selection of end points are just some examples of what we call 
representational decisions. With respect to these decisions, "There is no correct 
answer!" (Glasser and Howard 2006, 1108) other than the one that is adequate for 
purpose- and purposes differ among epistemic agents. This adds a layer of complexity 
to RR, since epistemic agents routinely pick up and use representational devices built 
by others, potentially with different purposes in mind. Just one form of this sort of 
'secondary use' of clinical trial results occurs in health economics, where simulation 
models are used to compare the cost and effectiveness of alternative clinical 
interventions in order to inform health policy (Drummond et al., 2005). To build these 
models, health economists routinely derive 'effectiveness' parameter values from 
published clinical trials. In theory, more than one sort of inadequacy for purpose could 
arise in this context: for example, if participants with co-morbidities were excluded from 
a particular trial, the effectiveness estimate derived from that trial could be inadequate 
for purpose, as it may not generalize to the larger population of patients affected by 
health policy.15 How do health economists determine if parameter values from published 
clinical trials are adequate for their purposes? 
 
The secondary use of clinical trial results in health economics models, we think, points 
to a number of background conditions relevant to RR. One of the more obvious ones is 
individual and group-level knowledge: if health economists building a simulation model 
are unaware of the inadequacy of a parameter value for their purpose, surely they will 
be less likely to seek a more adequate one, or conduct sensitivity analyses to explore 
the effect of varying it. However, another important condition might well be epistemic 
complexity: as Parker and Winsberg (2018) emphasize, modellers sometimes lack the 
ability to change a parameter value (or other representational choice), for multiple 
reasons rooted in the complexity of computational models. Still another might be the 
modellers' institutional context and the demands it makes (cf. Winsberg, Huebner, and 
Kukla 2014). For example, health economists sometimes make representational 
choices under time constraints, which may give an incentive to carry over 
representational choices from published models, even if they may be inadequate for 
purpose. This was established in a qualitative study of health economists, who were 
briefed about Parker and Winsberg's (2018) argument and asked about the possibility 
for values in modelling to have a ‘cascade’ effect (Harvard, Werker, and Silva 2020). 
One participant's description of building a model, we think, evokes both epistemic 
complexity and institutional context: 
 
 "… me and another guy made it up in a week. That and the assumptions, 
 
15 This point relates to the well-known issue of 'explanatory' versus 'pragmatic' clinical 
trials, also discussed by Bluhm (2017), in which participant eligibility criteria are more or 
less strict by design. 
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 literally in a week. A big week, because we were on a deadline … I still see 
 people today using those same assumptions that we made in a week, today, in l
 like [distant country]. Are they the right assumptions? I don't know. They seem 
 alright, but like, you see how that cascade happens." (Harvard, Werker, and Silva 
 2020, 9). 
 
 
6. Conclusions and Implications for Current Debates in Values in Science 
 
In this paper, we have defended three closely related proposals: to employ Hempel's 
conception of inductive risk; to draw a conceptual boundary between endorsing a 'fact' 
and making a representational decision; and to conceptualize 'representational risk' as a 
unique epistemic risk. In this section, we outline the implications of each proposal for 
current debates in the values in science literature. 
 
In their epilogue to a collection of case studies in values in science, Elliott and Richards 
(2017b) highlight the ongoing debate over how to conceptualize inductive risk. Major 
areas of investigation for philosophers, they remark, include questions about the 
"nature" of inductive risk, like "Must inductive risk involve the acceptance or rejection of 
hypotheses?" and "Should the argument from inductive risk focus on errors or on 
standards of evidence?" (Elliott and Richards 2017b, 274). Here, we have argued in 
favour of employing Hempel's conception of inductive risk: the risk of endorsing a 'fact' 
whose objective truth value is false. This conception, we note, gives us straightforward 
answers to the above questions: that is, inductive risk must involve the acceptance or 
rejection of a truth-apt claim about the world with an objective truth value, and the AIR 
should focus on 'errors' in the specific sense of endorsing a 'fact' whose objective truth 
value is false. Answering these two questions is advantageous, particularly because 
conceptual clarity around inductive risk, specifically, should help advance the literature 
on "epistemic risk" generally (Biddle & Kukla 2017; Biddle 2018). Biddle and Kukla 
(2017), for example, argue persuasively that not all risks in science should be construed 
as inductive risk- and many philosophers appear sympathetic to this idea, as the term 
epistemic risk has begun to appear in the values in science literature (e.g., Valles 2018; 
Winsberg, Oreskes, and Lloyd 2020). However, Biddle and Kukla's (2017) argument is 
weakened somewhat by a degree of ambiguity in their definition of inductive risk. This 
ambiguity is noticeable in a passage in which they associate inductive risk both with 
inference from evidence, generally, and inference from statistical evidence, specifically: 
 
 "One variety of epistemic risk, as we have already seen, is inductive risk —again, 
 traditionally understood as the risk of wrongly accepting or rejecting a hypothesis 
 on the basis of evidence. Inductive risk is in at least one important sense different 
 in kind from alethic risk, as it is located at a certain point during the practical 
 process of settling our beliefs and generating knowledge, namely in the inference 
 from statistical evidence to an empirical conclusion." (Biddle & Kukla 2017, 218, 
 italics ours). 
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Biddle, too, sometimes gives the impression that he associates inductive risk 
specifically with inferences from statistical evidence (2018, 2020a), other times with 
evidence generally (2020b). For example, in analyzing two cases of epistemic risk, he 
comments "Neither of these risks is best thought of as inductive risk; neither is a 
mistake made in inferring a hypothesis from statistical evidence" (Biddle 2018, 365, 
italics ours). We argue that employing Hempel's conception of inductive risk will 
eliminate any ambiguity around this core concept, and better position philosophers to 
distinguish inductive risk from other varieties of epistemic risk. This, we argue, is 
significant, as we agree with Biddle (2018) that it is important "to investigate more fully 
the various types of epistemic risk, how they relate to one another, and how they might 
be managed" (365). We will return to the concept of epistemic risk once more below. 
 
Other debates in the inductive risk literature concern the distinction between 'direct' and 
'indirect' roles for values in science. Specifically, Elliott and Richards (2017b, 274) ask 
"How is the distinction between direct and indirect roles best characterized in practice?", 
and "Is the distinction between direct and indirect roles the best replacement for the 
VFI?", marking these as major questions to address in future investigations of inductive 
risk. In short, our answer to the first question is: with further reference to the difference 
between endorsing a 'fact' and making a representational decision. Indeed, a lack of 
attention to this difference seems to contribute to the ambiguity in Douglas' (2009) 
characterization of the direct/indirect role distinction (cf. Elliott 2013). As Elliott (2013) 
shows, Douglas develops two interpretations of the distinction: on the 'Logical' 
distinction, values can be treated as warrant or evidence for a claim (direct role), or 
values can influence decisions about how much evidence is sufficient to accept a claim 
(indirect role) (Elliott 2013, 377). On the 'Consequential' distinction, values can influence 
scientists’ choices based on intended outcomes that they want to bring about by 
accepting a claim (direct role) or values can influence scientists’ choices based on 
unintended consequences associated with mistakes that they want to avoid (indirect 
role) (Elliott 2013, 377). To develop an unambiguous distinction between direct/indirect 
roles for values, we think, it is essential to define both the terms 'claim' and 'outcome'16 
with reference to representation. For one, as we have shown, representational 
decisions do not amount to 'claims'. Furthermore, outcomes of representational 
decisions (i.e., outcomes manifest in representations) differ from outcomes of decisions 
whether or not to endorse a fact (i.e., outcomes manifest in the actions of epistemic 
agents). One of the key benefits of distinguishing between endorsing a 'fact' and making 
a representational decision is seeing that representation specifically puts non-epistemic 
values in a 'direct' role- that is, a straightforward and conspicuous one. As we have 
shown, the purpose of a representation always informs representational decisions: 
 
16 To confirm, Douglas (2009, 96) herself uses both the terms 'claim' and 'outcome' in 
defining the direct/indirect role distinction: e.g.,"values can act as reasons in themselves 
to accept a claim, providing direct motivation for the adoption of a theory"; "In the direct 
role, values	determine our decisions in and of themselves, acting as stand-alone 
reasons to motivate our choices. They do this by placing value on some intended option 
or outcome, whether it is to valorize the choice or condemn it."  
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nothing makes this clearer than legitimate, purposeful choices of false parameter values 
in simulation models. 
 
Our answer to Elliott and Richards' first question, we think, should also help inform their 
second, i.e., whether the direct/indirect role distinction is the "best replacement for the 
VFI" (Elliott and Richards 2017b, 274). Many philosophers seem to think the 
direct/indirect role distinction cannot be the ‘best replacement’ because it tries, yet fails, 
to address the problem of wishful thinking (Elliott 2013; de Melo-Martín & Intemann 
2016; Steel & Whyte 2012). As de Melo-Martín and Intemann (2016) put it, the 
direct/indirect role distinction tries to address the problem of wishful thinking by ensuring 
that values "play no direct role in determining what the evidence is, such that a 
predetermined outcome would be favored" (509, italics ours), yet fails because 
decisions about how much evidence is needed "can indeed influence what evidence 
there is, or “rig” the methodologies used toward achieving a predesired outcome" (509). 
This seems right: for the direct/indirect role distinction to be a good replacement for the 
VFI, it would need to address the problem of wishful thinking. The distinction between 
RR and IR points us to one way the fundamental proposal might be salvageable. One 
possibility worth evaluating, in other words, is that non-epistemic values should be 
recognized as inevitably playing a direct role in informing representational decisions, but 
should be limited to an indirect role in informing decisions to endorse a 'fact'.  
 
Our last proposal is to conceptualize representational risk as a unique epistemic risk. 
Indeed, we wish to argue that representational risk should be regarded as a 'core' type 
of epistemic risk, equal in significance to inductive risk. In our view, representational 
decisions and decisions to endorse a 'fact' are both core hazards in science- on par with 
one another at least in terms of incidence and prevalence- yet ones that should be 
distinguished and analyzed separately for the risks they create. Our argument, we think, 
advances the literature on epistemic risk by addressing two of its current shortcomings 
(Biddle & Kukla 2017; Biddle 2018, 2020a, 2020b). First, most modestly, the epistemic 
risk literature lacks a framework to assist in distinguishing between epistemic risks, and 
we think our method of contrasting hazards, hazardous events, harms, and background 
conditions will prove useful in this respect. Second, and more importantly, Biddle and 
Kukla (2017) and Biddle (2018) have argued that inductive risk is just one type of 
epistemic risk and that there are "many others" (e.g., Biddle 2018, 365), yet their 
identification of epistemic risks has been more pragmatic than systematic. At the very 
least, they have not sought to establish whether any epistemic risks rival inductive risk 
(e.g., in terms of their incidence and prevalence in science), or to analyze in detail the 
relationships between the different epistemic risks they identify. We note that many of 
the “phronetic” risks that Biddle and Kukla (2017) identify- data formation risk, model 
choice risk, conceptual definition and operationalization risk (222), power risk, framing 
risk (Biddle 2018)- involve representational decisions. By conceptualizing 
representational risk, we aim to establish that there is indeed an epistemic risk that 
rivals inductive risk, and that many of the epistemic risks identified so far appear to be 
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